

Privacy in Visual Data

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The Challenge of Privacy and its Protection

- Privacy is **highly subjective** and difficult to define
 - Related to “the ability of an individual or group to **seclude themselves**, or **information about themselves**”
- Privacy has a **significant impact on society** and is addressed in numerous fields
 - Warren, Brandeis. „The Right to Privacy.“ 1890.
 - „EU General Data Protection Regulation“. effective in 2018
- Privacy is **increasingly at risk**
 - Technological progress, change in politics, limited awareness

Privacy in Data(bases)

- Draw conclusions for the **entire population** (or parts of) but **avoid linkage of sensitive information** to individuals

Name	SSN	Age	ZIP	Sex	Disease
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[30,39]	9***	female	Flu
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[40,49]	9***	male	Cancer
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[30,39]	9***	female	Flu
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[40,49]	9***	male	Flu
...

Explicit identifier

Quasi identifier

Sensitive information

- **Anonymization** as key protection method
- Modify quasi identifier to achieve **k anonymity**

Privacy in Visual Data



Who is there?


- (Quasi-)Identifiers
- Body or face regions

What is shown?

- Sensitive information
- presence,
„show an object“
„captured in a box“

How to avoid linkage of sensitive information to individuals?

Privacy Threats: Algorithms



Face Detection

- Where are the faces?

Face Recognition

- What are their IDs?

Scene Analysis

- What is shown?

Protection approach: make recognition/identification difficult

Privacy Threats: Meta-Data

EXIF Data (selected)

- Authors
- Photographers
- Date
- Image dimensions
- Camera model
- Serial number
- Focal length
- GPS position
-

Derived meta-data

- „Person“
- „Camera“
- „UAV“
- „Pervasive Computing“
- „Sitting“

Tipp: Query for derived meta-data

Encoded in image

- Image descriptors
- Automatically inserted by many cameras

Derived from image


- Scene analysis

Linked w/ other data

- Social media
- Retrieval (search)

Protection approach: avoid storage and linkage of meta-data

Privacy Threats: Big Data



Google claims its 'FaceNet' system has almost perfected recognising human faces - and is accurate 99.96% of the time

- Facebook's rival DeepFace uses technology from Israeli firm face.com
- DeepFace finds a matching face with 97.25% accuracy
- Google researchers call their system the most-accurate technology

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Meet Skydrive: Toyota backs Japanese

Data Collection

- Cloud computing, IoT
- © UMass, LWF

Machine Learning


- Boost by deep learning
- © Taigman et al. CVPR14

Performance

- Close to humans and steadily improving
- © Daily Mail, 2015

Protection method: **rely on formal frameworks**

Utility and Privacy Tradeoff



No single **best protection** method available

Distortion as key protection method

- Blanking
- Pixelation
- Blurring
- Cartooning

Utility dependent on level of distortion

- Similarity
- Appearance
- Detectability


Our Research Focus

1. What **distortion method** to use?
 - Explore utility/privacy/cost design space
 - Adapt filter strength for optimizing utility&privacy
2. How to **hinder privacy attacks**?
 - Perform protection onboard of cameras
 - Make „reverse engineering“ difficult
3. How to **securely implement** privacy protection?
 - Apply security methods to maintain integrity and authenticity
 - Rely on hardware-supported protection

[Winkler, Rinner. [Security and Privacy Protection in Visual Sensor Networks: A Survey](#). ACM Computing Surveys. 2014.]

#1 Adapt Blur to Target Resolution


- Privacy **design space exploration** with adaptive filtering
 - Determine target's pixel density based on camera pose
 - Decide whether target is inherently protected
 - Configure privacy protection filter
 - Perform adaptive filtering
- Studied for **aerial images**



[Sawar, Rinner, Cavallaro. [Design Space Exploration for Adaptive Privacy Protection in Airborne Images](#). In Proc. AVSS 2016.]

Pixel Density Estimation

- Horizontal and vertical density at target center



$$\rho_h = \frac{f \cos(\beta)}{p_h (h_1 - h_2)}$$


horizontal pixel size

$$\rho_v \approx \frac{f \cos(\beta) \sin(\beta)}{p_v (h_1 - h_2)}$$

vertical pixel size

Adaptive Privacy Filter

- Configure filter \mathcal{G} so that privacy protection is increased while fidelity is maintained

$$I_t^P = \mathcal{G}(I_t, R, \mu)$$


filter strength
 face region
 unprotected frame at time t
 filter operator

- Determine **filter strength** μ such that the pixel resolution in the protected image is just below the threshold

Gaussian Blur as Privacy Filter

- Approximated anisotropic Gaussian kernel

$$g(v, h) = \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma_v\sigma_h} e^{-\left(\frac{v^2}{2\sigma_v^2} + \frac{h^2}{2\sigma_h^2}\right)}$$

with


$$\sigma_i = \frac{3\rho_i}{\pi\rho_i^0} \text{ where } i \in \{v, h\}$$

- Filtering with kernel size


$$\mu_i = 2\lceil 3\sigma_i \rceil + 1$$

useful information in I_t^p is reduced to the threshold ρ_i^0


Adaptive Gaussian Blur Example




$\rho: (5.03, 3.88)$




$\mu: (121, 105)$






$\mu: (99, 77)$



$\mu: (75, 57)$



$\mu: (59, 47)$



Original

Fixed

Over


Optimal

Under


Gaussian blur for LDA face recognizer

Fixed: w.r.t. highest pixel density image in the data


Adaptive Gaussian Blur Example




$\rho: (5.03, 3.88)$




$\mu: (121, 105)$



$\mu: (99, 77)$




$\mu: (75, 57)$




$\mu: (59, 47)$




$\rho: (3.96, 2.87)$



$\mu: (121, 105)$




$\mu: (75, 57)$




$\mu: (59, 43)$




$\mu: (47, 35)$




$\rho: (3.06, 2.28)$



$\mu: (121, 105)$



$\mu: (61, 45)$



$\mu: (45, 35)$



$\mu: (37, 29)$

Original

Fixed*

Over*

Optimal*

Under*

*Gaussian Blur for LDA face recognizer

Fixed: w.r.t. highest pixel density image in the data



Experimental Setup

- Dataset from [Hsu, 2015]
 - Population size: 11 persons
 - Test data: 693 (63 x 11) images collected from 63 different positions.
 - Training data: 121 images i.e. 11 images of each person.
- Popular face recognizers for **privacy measurement**:
 - Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [Belhumeur, 1997]
 - Local Binary Patterns Histograms (LBPH) [Ahonen, 2006]
- **Fidelity measurement**:
 - Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
 - Structural Similarity Index metric (SSIM) [Wang 2004]

Original data

- Pixel density of faces
 - Range [1.15, 9.8] px/cm


- Face recognition accuracy
 - Performance of LDA & LBPH
 - Random classifier for threshold identification



Privacy of adaptively blurred Faces


LDA face recognizer

Thresholds: 0,6 & 0.4 px/cm




LBPH face recognizer

Thresholds: 0.4 & 0.2 px/cm




Fidelity Comparison

Peak Signal to Noise Ratio




Structural Similarity Index



#2 Hinder Privacy Attacks

Modelling privacy protection systems



Distortion (utility)

$$D = \lambda(X; Y)$$

Information leakage (privacy protection)



$$L = \lambda(X; \hat{X})$$

What if the attacker has some knowledge about F ?

Parrot Attacks

Attacker knows (learns) the **protection filter** (eg. blurring filter)

Original data Defender $F: X \rightarrow Y$ Protected data



Training data (background knowledge)


Train the recognizer in **protected domain**

- increase of information leakage

Adaptive Blurring with Spatial Hopping (AHGMM)

Pseudo-randomly change filter parameters for small patches to hinder

- Estimation of filter parameter
- Reconstruction of original image



[Sawar, Rinner, Cavallaro. [Adaptive Hopping Gaussian Mixture Model for Privacy-Preserving Aerial Photography](#). Under review 2017.]

Experimental Setup

- Labelled Faces in the Wild Dataset
 - Population size: 5749 persons
 - Expanded for [aerial imagery](#)
40 instances for each person (variation in pitch angle and resolution)




Experimental Setup (2)

- Privacy **attack scenarios**
 - Naïve: training with raw data
 - Parrot: training with AHGMM filtered data (3 variants)
 - **Pitch angle** is known by attacker as background
 - Tested with 380000 face images in total
- OpenFace recognizer for **privacy measurement**:
 - Verification test (600 persons with 10x cross validation)
- **Fidelity measurement**:
 - Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
 - Structural Similarity Index metric (SSIM) [Wang 2004]

Privacy Evaluation


- Comparison with 3 state-of-the-art privacy filters (**-AHGMM**)
 - Charts: privacy level η vs. pitch angle; rows: different filter thresholds



Privacy/Utility Tradeoff


- Privacy level vs. utility compared with 3 privacy filters (-AHGMM)

SSIM (%)




(a)

PSNR (dB)




(b)

Naive attack



(c)



(d)

Parrot attack


#3 Secure and Privacy-aware Camera

- Vision: **TrustEYE** - security and privacy protection as a **feature of the image sensor** instead of the camera
- Benefits:
 - Sensor delivers **protected** and **pre-filtered** data
 - Strong separation btw. trusted and untrusted domains
 - Camera software does no longer have to be trustworthy
 - Security **can not be bypassed** by application developers
 - TrustEYE is **anchor for secure inter-camera collaboration**


[Winkler, Erdelyi, Rinner. [TrustEYE.M4: Protecting the Sensor - not the Camera](#). In Proc. AVSS 2014]

<http://trusteye.aau.at/>

TrustEYE Architecture



TrustEYE Platform



Bottom Side (not visible):

2MB SRAM, TPM Security IC, Power Management IC (LiPo Charger), Micro USB Connector, Reset Button

TrustEYE Demo

Conclusion

- Privacy protection important for commercial and private aerial imaging
- No single best protection method available. Tradeoff between protection, utility and resource usage
- Mostly image distortion used for protection, some can adapt the filter strength to scene
- Increase privacy awareness

Acknowledgements



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Institute of Networked and
Embedded Systems

<http://nes.aau.at>

<http://bernhardrinner.com>

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- FFG “Progressing towards Secure, Cooperating Smart Cameras”